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I am as big of a fan of this engine as anybody - this is a quote from an offical Army monograph of logistics in Vietnam (Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 72-600389), so don't argue with ME about what it says.
The author of this monograph, Lieutenant General Joseph M. Heiser, Jr., had been engaged in planning and directing logistical support to the U.S. Army soldier, other U.S. Services, and the Armed Forces of Allied Nations since his commissioning as an officer in the Ordnance Corps in 1943. Having served in the Southern Base Sector Command of the European Theater of Operations from 1943 to 1945, he became a staff officer of the Office of the Chief of Ordnance. He later served as the Executive Officer of the Ordnance School and Division Ordnance Officer, 7th Infantry Division, Korea. He was designated Commanding General, U.S. Communications Zone Europe in 1965. He then became, successively, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff Logistics (Supply and Maintenance), Headquarters, Department of the Army, Commanding General of the 1st Logistical Command, Vietnam, and Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics of the U.S. Army
A minor typo in the original document - "LD 427" should be LDS-427.
Best wishes,
David Doyle
"Service Support in Vietnam:
Transportation and Maintenance
Though not a maintenance fault, failures of multifuel engines created the requirement for a major off-shore maintenance effort and a sizeable supply problem. In January 1967, more than 300 5-ton trucks were deadlined in Vietnam because of inoperative multifuel engines (a similar condition existed for 2½-ton trucks) due to cracked blocks, blown head gaskets, valve stems and connecting rods. A study indicated that many failures occurred between 9,000 and 10,000 miles and that the units hardest hit were the line haul transportation units whose engines were subjected to continuous use (2,000 miles per month in Vietnam). The prospect for improvement at this point was negligible because of the lack of repair parts and overhaul capacity. Multifuel engines powered both 2½- and 5-ton trucks. A similar condition also existed in Thailand. The annual engine replacement rate of 6 per 100 vehicles per year increased to a rate of one engine per vehicle per year.
By the summer of 1967, an airlift program, Red Ball Express was put into effect in an attempt to alleviate the shortage of engines and repair parts. The Red Ball Express was designed to be used in lieu of normal procedures exclusively to expedite repair parts to remove equipment from deadline status. Reserved and predictable airlift was made available for this purpose. The seriousness of the situation led to a multifuel engine conference on 28 August 1967. The conference resulted in several recommendations, the most significant of which was that three multifuel engines, LD 427, LD 465, and LDS 465, were to be placed under Closed Loop Support management because of the inability of units in the field to cope with the maintenance problem. A further recommendation was made that return to the Continental U.S. be authorized for vehicles that could not be supported with multifuel repair parts or replacement engine assemblies. Because a large percentage of the producers' production capacity was consumed in end items assembly, some repair parts and new replacement engine assemblies were not readily available. Department of the Army approved the recommendations of the conference and directed that necessary retrograde, overhaul, and shipping operations be initiated immediately.
Although the conference had focused attention on the supply aspect and premature failure of engines, significant intangibles remained unsolved, including proper operation of vehicles and user maintenance. Because of the characteristic difference of the multifuel engine from the standard internal combustion engine, periodic maintenance and specific mandatory operational procedures differed sharply from procedures used with other vehicles and required closer attention. Simply put, despite years of testing effort, the multifuel engine did not possess the ruggedness and tolerance to withstand the abuses inherent in field operations."
The author of this monograph, Lieutenant General Joseph M. Heiser, Jr., had been engaged in planning and directing logistical support to the U.S. Army soldier, other U.S. Services, and the Armed Forces of Allied Nations since his commissioning as an officer in the Ordnance Corps in 1943. Having served in the Southern Base Sector Command of the European Theater of Operations from 1943 to 1945, he became a staff officer of the Office of the Chief of Ordnance. He later served as the Executive Officer of the Ordnance School and Division Ordnance Officer, 7th Infantry Division, Korea. He was designated Commanding General, U.S. Communications Zone Europe in 1965. He then became, successively, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff Logistics (Supply and Maintenance), Headquarters, Department of the Army, Commanding General of the 1st Logistical Command, Vietnam, and Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics of the U.S. Army
A minor typo in the original document - "LD 427" should be LDS-427.
Best wishes,
David Doyle
"Service Support in Vietnam:
Transportation and Maintenance
Though not a maintenance fault, failures of multifuel engines created the requirement for a major off-shore maintenance effort and a sizeable supply problem. In January 1967, more than 300 5-ton trucks were deadlined in Vietnam because of inoperative multifuel engines (a similar condition existed for 2½-ton trucks) due to cracked blocks, blown head gaskets, valve stems and connecting rods. A study indicated that many failures occurred between 9,000 and 10,000 miles and that the units hardest hit were the line haul transportation units whose engines were subjected to continuous use (2,000 miles per month in Vietnam). The prospect for improvement at this point was negligible because of the lack of repair parts and overhaul capacity. Multifuel engines powered both 2½- and 5-ton trucks. A similar condition also existed in Thailand. The annual engine replacement rate of 6 per 100 vehicles per year increased to a rate of one engine per vehicle per year.
By the summer of 1967, an airlift program, Red Ball Express was put into effect in an attempt to alleviate the shortage of engines and repair parts. The Red Ball Express was designed to be used in lieu of normal procedures exclusively to expedite repair parts to remove equipment from deadline status. Reserved and predictable airlift was made available for this purpose. The seriousness of the situation led to a multifuel engine conference on 28 August 1967. The conference resulted in several recommendations, the most significant of which was that three multifuel engines, LD 427, LD 465, and LDS 465, were to be placed under Closed Loop Support management because of the inability of units in the field to cope with the maintenance problem. A further recommendation was made that return to the Continental U.S. be authorized for vehicles that could not be supported with multifuel repair parts or replacement engine assemblies. Because a large percentage of the producers' production capacity was consumed in end items assembly, some repair parts and new replacement engine assemblies were not readily available. Department of the Army approved the recommendations of the conference and directed that necessary retrograde, overhaul, and shipping operations be initiated immediately.
Although the conference had focused attention on the supply aspect and premature failure of engines, significant intangibles remained unsolved, including proper operation of vehicles and user maintenance. Because of the characteristic difference of the multifuel engine from the standard internal combustion engine, periodic maintenance and specific mandatory operational procedures differed sharply from procedures used with other vehicles and required closer attention. Simply put, despite years of testing effort, the multifuel engine did not possess the ruggedness and tolerance to withstand the abuses inherent in field operations."
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